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THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
APPLICABLE TO BILLS AND NOTES
II. FORMAL AND ESSENTIAL VALIDITY
The Hague Convention requires a bill or note to be desig-
nated as such, the provision being intended to give to the
instrument an earmark which will readily identify it.' The
bill or note must.indicate also the date, the place of issue and
the name of the payee. 2 Anglo-American law is different in
all of the above respects.
The only form of acceptance recognized by the Conven-
tion of the Hague is an acceptance upon the face of the bill
itself.3 In England and the United States it need not be upon
the face of the bill.4 Under the Negotiable Instruments Law
it need not appear even upon the bill.5 An unconditional
promise in writing to accept a bill before it is drawn is deemed
an actual acceptance in favor of every person, who, on the
faith thereof, receives the bill for value.6
In England a bill or note may be void for want of a stamp.7
The Hague Convention prohibits its members specifically to
subordinate the validity of engagements taken in matters of
bills and notes to a compliance with the stamp laws, and au-
thorizes them only to suspend the exercise of the rights con-
ferred until the prescribed stamp duties have been paid."
What is the rule in the Conflict of Laws governing the for-
mal validity of a bill or note?
1. According to Article 2 of the Convention any contracting state may
prescribe, however, that bills of exchange issued within its territory
which do not bear the designation "bill of exchange" shall be valid,
provided they contain the express indication that they are payable to
order.
2. Art. 1, Uniform Law.
Where a bill of exchange does not bear the name of the place of
issue it is deemed to have been drawn at the place designated beside
the name of the drawer. Art. 2, Uniform Law.
3. Art. 24, paragraph 1, Uniform Law.
4. B. E. A., Sec. 17 (2) (a).
5. N. I. L., Sec. 134.
6. N. I. L., Sec. 135.
7. See Stamp Act, 1891, 54 and 55 Vict., Ch. 39.
8. Art. 19 of the Convention.
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1. English Law: The rules of the English law are con-
tained in Section 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act, which pro-
vides as follows:
"Where a bill drawn in one country is negotiated, accepted
or payable in another, the right, duties and liabilities of the
parties thereto. are determined as follows:
(1) The validity of a bill as regards requisites in form is
determined by the law of the place of issue, and the
validity as regards requisites in form of the superven-
ing contracts, such as acceptance or indorsement, or
acceptance supra protest, is determined by the law of
the place where such contract was made.
"Provided that:
(a) Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom it
is not invalid by reason only that it is not stamped in
accordance with the law of the place of issue.
(b) Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, con-
forms, as regards requisites in form, to the law of the
United Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of enforcing
payment thereof, be treated as valid as between all
persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in
the United Kingdom."
Proviso (a) is restricted in its application by the words
"where a bill drawn in one country is negotiated, accepted or
payable in another", so that it would not cover the case where
suit is brought in England upon a bill drawn, negotiated,
accepted and payable in a foreign country.9 In so far as it
applies it adopts the rule laid down by some of the English
courts which have declined to enforce the revenue laws of a
foreign country.
Proviso (b) departs from the ordinary rules governing the
formal validity of contracts in the Conflict of Laws. Though
the lex loci contractus is not satisfied, as regards requisites of
form, a foreign contract shall be regarded as valid as between
persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties thereto in the
United Kingdom for the purpose of enforcing payment there-
of, provided it conforms to the laws of the United Kingdom.
It will probably be held to apply also to foreign acceptances
and indorsements. Under this proviso, as its words imply,
a party who drew, accepted, or indorsed a bill or note in a
foreign country can not be held in England unless his contract
satisfies the lex loci contractus. A mandatory and not merely
9. See James v. Catherwood, (1823) 3 D. & R. 190.
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a permissive effect is thus given to the rule locus regit actum,
proviso (b) constituting but a partial exception.
2. American Law: There are comparatively few cases
discussing the question of the formal validity of bills and
notes. Those that deal with the matter have involved usually
the validity of an oral acceptance of a bill of exchange or the
validity of bills and notes not complying with stamp re-
quirements. The two leading cases on the subject of oral
acceptances are Scudder v. The Union National Bank'10 and
Hall v. Cordell." In the former it was held that a parol agree-
ment made in Illinois to accept a draft previously drawn upon
the promisor at St. Louis, being valid by the law of Illinois,
would support an action against the promisor or acceptor of
the draft notwithstanding that by the law of Missouri, where
the draft was payable, such parol promise was not sufficient.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Hunt, "Matters bearing upon the execution, the inter-
pretation, and the validity of a contract are determined by the
law of the state where the contract is made. Matters con-
nected with its performance are regulated by the law prevail-
ing at the place of performance.'1 2  This statement is gener-
ally cited in support of the doctrine that the law of the place of
execution governs the formality necessary for the validity of a
contract. This expresses, no doubt, the opinion of the court,
for Mr. Justice Hunt quotes from Wheaton on the Conflict
of Laws, and Parsons on Bills and Notes to the same effect.
Nevertheless the statement was a mere dictum under the
facts of the case.'
3
10. (1875) 91 U. S. 406, 23 L. Ed. 245.
11. (1891) 142 U. S. 116, 12 S. C. R. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956.
12. At pp. 412-413.
13. "There is no statute in the state of Illinois", says the learned
Justice, "that requires an acceptance of a bill of exchange to be in
writing, or that prohibits a parol promise to accept a bill of exchange:
on the contrary, a parol acceptance and a parol promise to accept are
valid in that state, and the decisions of its highest court hold that a
parol promise to accept a bill is an acceptance thereof. If this be so,
no question of jurisdiction or of conflict of laws arises. The contract
to accept was not only made in Illinois, but the bill was then and
there actually accepted in Illinois, as perfectly as if Mr. Scudder had
written an acceptance across its face, and signed thereto the name of
his firm. The contract to accept the bill was not to be performed in
Missouri. It had already, by the promise, been performed in Illinois.
The contract to pay was, indeed, to be performed in Missouri; but
that was a different contract from that of acceptance." At p. 413.
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In Hall v. Cordell the defendants of Chicago at Marshall,
Missouri, verbally agreed with plaintiffs, bankers at the latter
place, that defendants would accept and pay all drafts drawn
upon them by one Farlow for cattle bought by Farlow and
shipped by him to the defendants from Missouri. The defen-
dants refused to pay- upon presentation a draft drawn upon
them under this agreement. By statute in Missouri an agree-
ment to accept bills of exchange must be in writing. The de-
fendants contended that by reason of that statute the con-
tract could not be the basis for a recovery in Illinois. The
Supreme Court of the United States held, however, as follows:
"We are, however, of opirfion that, upon principle and
authority, the rights of the parties are not to be determined
by the law of Missouri. The statute of that state can have
no application to an action brought to charge a person, in
Illinois, upon a parol promise to accept and pay a bill of
exchange payable in Illinois. The agreement to accept and
pay, or to pay upon presentation, was to be entirely performed
in Illinois, which was the state of the residence and place of
business of the defendants. They were not bound to accept
or pay elsewhere than at the place to which, by the terms of
the agreement, the stock was to be shipped. Nothing in the
case shows that the parties had in view, in respect to the
execution of the contract, any other law than the law of the
place of performance. That law, consequently, must deter-
mine the rights of the parties."'14
If the statement in the Scudder case that matters bearing
upon the execution are determined by the law of the place of
execution means to say that the lex loci contractus is the only
law which, in the nature of things, can give binding force to
the will of the parties, it is, of course, inconsistent with the
case of Hall v. Cordell which applies the intention of the
parties as the test. The cases can be harmonized if the rule
locus regit actum, which Mr. Justice Hunt mentions in quoting
from Wheaton, were recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States as having a permissive sense, according to
which a transaction would be valid, as regards formalities, if
it complied with the lex loci contractus or with that of the
state, which governs the validity of the transaction in other
respects. The Scudder case would then fall within the first
branch of the rule and Hall v. Cordell within the second. The
objection to this interpretation is that there is no evidence in
the opinion of the two cases to indicate that the Supreme
14. At p. 120.
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Court meant to adopt the rule locus regit actum in an optional
sense. Nowhere does it appear that the court would subject
the formal requirements to a rule differing from that deter-
mining the validity of the contract in general. It seems to be
assumed throughout that all matters bearing upon the execu-
tion of a contract, including all formalities, are subject to one
law. This law is said to be the lex loci contractus in the
Scudder case and the lex loci solutionis, on account of the
presumed intention of the parties, in Hall v. Cordell.15  In
both cases the agreement was upheld. Hence it might be
suggested that just as is held in the usury cases, so in the
matter of the formal validity of contracts, the parties will be
presumed to have contracted with reference to the law of the
place that will support the contract. The difficulty with this
conclusion is that the Supreme Court in the Scudder case
appears to lay down the rule that the lex loci contractus gov-
erns all matters bearing upon the execution of contracts as an
absolute rule and not on the ground of presumptive intent.
All that can be safely said is, therefore, that in the opinion of
the Supreme Court the validity of a contract, as regards form,
aside from the Statute of Frauds, which brings in the ques-
tion of Procedure, is subject to the law controlling the valid-
ity of the contract in other respects; and that the Supreme
Court, in a desire to uphold the contract, accepted the lex loci
contractus as the governing law in the Scudder case and the
lex loci solutionis in Hall v. Cordell.
Very few cases appear to have arisen in the state courts
since the decision of the Scudder case and Hall v. Cordell."6
Most of the decisions prior to the above cases favored the lex
loci contractus1 7 The lower federal courts have dealt with
.15. The Supreme Court of the United States has never followed a
consistent theory governing the validity of contracts in the Conflict
of Laws. See Pritchard v. Norton, (1882) 106 U. S. 124; 1 S. C. R.
102, 27 L. Ed. 107; Cox v. The United States, (1832) 6 Pet. 172;
Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., (1889) 129 U. S. 397,
9 S. C. R. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Clements.
(1891) 140 U. S. 226; 11 S. C. R. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497; London Assurance
v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiro, (1897) 167 U. S. 149, 17 S. C. R.
785, 42 L. Ed. 113.
16. In Bank of Laddonia v. Bright Coy Comm. Co., (1909) 139 Mo.
App. 110, 120 S. W. 648, the St. Louis Court of Appeals applied the law
of the place of performance, following Hall v. Cordell.
17. See Scott v. Pilkington, (1861) 15 Abb. Pr. 280; Lonsdale v.
Lafayette Bank, (1849) 18 Ohio 126; Worcester Bank v. Wells, (1844)
8 Met. (Mass.) 107; Bissell v. Lewis, (1857) 4 Mich. 450. This is true
also of the formal validity of contracts in general. Hunt v. Jones.
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the matter only in one or two instances since the above deci-
sions. In Exchange Bank v. Hubbards the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Second Cirduit applied the principle of the,
Scudder case without referring to Hall v. Cordell. When the
case came up on a subsequent appeal 19 the court adopted the
intention test laid down in Hall v. Cordell and, in the applica-
tion thereof, reached the conclusion that the parties under the
circumstances contracted with reference to the lex loci con-
tractus.
2 0
Where the formal requirement consists in the affixing of
a stamp or the use of stamped paper for revenue purp6ses,
non-compliance with such a law may result in the invalidity
of the obligation, or it may simply preclude the admissibility
of the instrument in evidence. In the latter event, the provi-
sion, being a procedural one, would have no extraterritorial
effect.21 Where the non-compliance with the stamp law ren-
ders the instrument void, there is conflict in the authorities.
Some courts apply the ordinary rule and deny all relief.22
Others have enforced the contract on the ground that no
regard should be paid to foreign revenue laws.23  A further
complication is presented when there is a difference between
the law of the place of execution of the contract and that of
its performance; for example, where the law of the place of
issue makes the contract void but the law of the place of
performance either has no stamp law or its stamp law affects
merely the admissibility of the instrument in evidence.
Assuming that foreign stamp laws are entitled to recognition
when they invalidate the contract, the question raised in this
case would be similar to that discussed in connection with oral
acceptances. In Vidal v. Thompson24 the law of the place of
issue was held to govern.
(1879) 12 R. I. 265; Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co., (1886) 15 R. I. 380;
Dacosta v. Davis, (1854) 24 N. J. L. 319.
18. (1894) 62 Fed. 112.
19. (1896) 72 Fed. 234.
20. The lex loci contractus as such appears to have been applied in
Russell v. Wiggin, (1842) 2 Story 213, Fed. Cas. No. 12,165, and Gar-
retson v. North Atchison Bank, (1891) 47 Fed. 867.
21. Fant v. Miller, (1866) 17 Gratt. (Va.) 47; Lambert v. Jones,
(1856) 2 Patten & H. (Va.) 144.
22. Satterthwaite v. Doughty, (1853) 44 N. C. 314; Fant v. Miller,
(1866) 17 Gratt. (Va.) 47.
23. Ludlow v. Rensselaer, (1806) 1 Johns. 93; Skinner v. Tinker,(1861) 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 333.
24. (1822) 11 Martin (La.) 23.
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3. French Law: A bill or note, its acceptance or indorse-
ment is valid, as regards form, if it satisfies the law of the
place of execution. 25 Although there is a tendency 6 on the
part of the French courts to give to the rule locus regit actum,
which was formerly imperative, 27 a permissive character, the
law of bills and notes has scarcely been affected thereby.28
Whether the above rule is applicable to foreign stamp laws is
uncertain.29
4. German Law: Article 85 of the German Exchange Act
reads as follows:
"The essential requirements of a bill of exchange drawn
abroad, as also every other statement on such a bill, are to be
decided according to the law of the place at which the state-
ment is made. If, however, the statements inserted abroad on
the bill satisfy the requirements of the inland law, no objec-
tion can be taken against the legal liability incurred by state-
ments subsequently made within the Empire (Inland) on the
ground that the statements made abroad do not satisfy the
foreign law. Statements on bills by which one German citizen
becomes bound to another German citizen in a foreign country,
are also valid although they only comply with the require-
ments of the inland law."
It will be noticed that the German Exchange Act speaks
of the essential requirements of bills and notes. From the
standpoint of the German law of exchange, which is strictly
formal, all essential requirements prescribed by the legislator
are in reality formal requirements.
The lex loci contractus means the law of the place of
execution; the law of the place of performance is of no im-
portance.5 0
Two exceptions are made by the German Exchange Act
to the application of the lex loci contractus, where the latter
would operate to invalidate the contract. No exception exists
where the contract is valid under such law. The first excep-
25. Trib. Civ. Marseilles, Sept. 5, 1876 (4 Clunet 425) ; Comm. Trib. Le
Havre, March 19, 1881 (9 Clunet 80) ; Paris, Dec. 8, 1883, (11 Clunet 285);
App. Bordeaux Jan. 24, 1880 (8 Clunet 360) ; June 7, 1880, (8 Clunet 155);
App. Paris Jan: 12, 1889 (16 Clunet 291); App. Besanon Jan. 25, 1910,
(Darras' Rev. 1910, 428).
26. Cass. June 14, 1899 (S. 1900, 1, 225) and note by Professor Pillet;
Cass. Aug. 18, 1856 (D. 1857, 1, 39).
27. App. Douai, Jan. 13, 1887 (S. 1890, 2, 148); Trib. Civ. Rouen, July
22, 1896 (26 Clunet 578).
28. But see Comm. Trib. Nice, May 22, 1912 (40 Clunet 156).
29. See Vincent & Penaud, pp. 345-346; Weiss IV, pp. 452-453.
30. 6 ROHG 127.
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tion provides that an acceptance or indorsement in Germany
of a foreign bill or note, which is void for want of compliance
with the formal requirements of the law of the place of issue,
is binding, provided such a bill or note complies with the
requirements of the German law. The second exception has
reference only to German subjects. It lays down the rule
that a contract between two German subjects entered into
abroad shall be binding if it meets the requirements of the
German law.
Article 11 of the Law of Introduction to the German Civil
Code, paragraph 1, has now the following general provision:
"The form of a legal transaction is controlled by the laws
governing the relation which constitutes the subject of the
transaction. However, compliance with the laws of the place
where the transaction is entered into is sufficient."
This article adopts the rule locus regit actum in a per-
missive sense, and sustains the contract, as regards formal
requisites, if it satisfies the lex loci contractus or the law
governing the contract, i. e. the lex loci solutionis or the lex
domicilii.81 It seems, however, that the above provision,
which went into effect on January 1st, 1900, is not applicable
to bills and notes and that the latter continue to be governed
by the special provisions of Article 85 of the General Exchange
Act of 1849.32
5. Italian Law: The Italian law is contained in Article 58
of the Commercial Code, which reads as follows:
"The form and essential requisites of commercial obliga-
tions * * * are governed by the law * * * of the place
* * * where the obligations are created * * *, save
the exception laid down in Article 9 of the Preliminary Dis-
positions of the Civil Code for those subject to one and the
same national law."
According to Article 9 of the Preliminary Dispositions of
the Civil Code the "extrinsic form of acts inter vivos * * *
shall be determined by the law of the place where. they are
done. The * * * contracting parties may choose, how-
ever, to follow their national law, provided the latter be com-
mon to all of the parties."
31. The German courts generally apply the law of the place of per-
formance. Reichsgericht, July 4, 1904 (15 Niemeyer 285) but some-
times the law of the domicile of the debtor. 61 RG 343, Oct. 12, 1905.
32. See Staub, Sec. 85; Planck, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, Art. 11
Law of Introduction.
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Two principal questions are suggested by the preceding
comparative statement of the law.
First-Should the rule locus regit actum be adopted as the
law governing the formal validity of bills and notes, and if so,
should it have an imperative or merely a permissive- char-
acter?
Second-What exceptions, if any, should be recognized to
this rule?
As regards the first question there can be no doubt that
the lex loci contractus is the controlling law. All of the
modern legislations admit this principle as well as the deci-
sions of the courts. Only in the United States there is some
uncertainty regarding the application of the above rule in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Hall v. Cordell, but the weight of authority agrees
with the general rule. The lex loci contractus is adopted also
by the Institute of International Law 33 and by the Convention
of the Hague.34 The text writers also are of the unanimous
opinion that the lex loci contractus should govern.35 The rule
laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Scudder case may be regarded, therefore, as the governing
law by almost universal assent.
There is no agreement, however, both in the positive law
and among the jurists as to whether or not the lex loci con-
tractus should be regarded as an exclusive rule.
This conflict of opinion has largely an historical founda-
tion and is connected with the nature of the rule locus regit
33. Annuaire VIII, p. 121.
34. Art. 75, Uniform Law, Senate Document No. 162, Sixty-third Con-
gress, First Session, p. 64.
35. Asser, p. 207; Audinet, p. 609; v. Bar, p. 671; Champcommunal,
Annales de Droit Commercial, II, p. 142; Chr6tien, Etude sur la Let-
tre de Change, p. 72; Conde y Luque, Derecho Internacional Privado,
II, p. 297; Despagnet, p. 987; Diena, III, p. 28; Esperson, Diritto Cam-
biario Internazionale, p. 20; Field, Art. 614; Meili, II, p. 331; Lyon-
Caen et Renault, IV, p. 545; Ottolenghi, p. 81; Val6ry, p. 1279; Weiss,
IV, p. 448.
Under the older continental theory, according to which the bill
of exchange was looked upon literally as a mandate from the drawer
to the drawee for the payment of funds belonging to the drawer, the
contract was deemed made at the domicile of the drawee. The formal
requirements were subjected, therefore, to the lex domicilii of the
drawee. Voet, Commentaria ad Pandectas, Bk. XXII, Tit. II, Sec. 10.
Dupuis de la Serra, L'Art des Lettres de Change, Ch. XV, No. 12, cited
in Mass6. Le Droit Commercial dans ses Rapports avec le Droit des
Gens et le Droit Civil, I, No. 589; Pothier, du Contrat de Change,
No. 155; Brocher, Cours de Droit International Priv6, II, pp. 315-316.
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actum in the Conflict of Laws. In Roman law and in the
earliest period of the development of the rules of the Conflict
of Laws in the Middle Ages, it seems that the validity of a
legal transaction, so far as its formal execution is concerned,
was determined by the same law that governed its validity
or legality in general. 36 The difficulty of complying with the
formal requirements of a foreign law and the injustice that
might result therefrom led Bartolus and his successors to
advocate that a will be deemed sufficiently executed if it com-
plied with the law of the place of execution. Through the
influence of Bartolus the rule locus regit actum, which was
extended later to other transactions, became established.
Being introduced on grounds of convenience the lex loci con-
tractus did not supplant the original rule and so it came that
the rule locus regit actum had at first only a permissive effect.
A legal transaction was valid, therefore, as regards formal
execution, if it satisfied the law of the place of execution or
the law governing its validity or legality in other respects.3 7
In the course of time the rule lost its original character in
some countries so as to become imperative; in others it re-
mained an alternative rule, except in certain classes of cases.3 8
In England and the United States the rule locus regit actum
was never accepted, except as to contracts, and with respect
to them only in a mandatory form. In those countries which,
in modern times, have pressed the claims of the national law,
the rule is not infrequently stated as allowing a compliance
with the lex loci contractus or the lex patriae which is com-
mon to the parties.
39
In the law of bills and notes Italy has adopted squarely
the rule locus regit actum in a permissive sense. Germany has
accepted it to a limited degree, namely, when German subjects
contract abroad. France, England and the United States, on
the other hand, prescribe the lex loci contractus, upon prin-
ciple, as an absolute rule.
36. See Cod. VI. 23. 9, as to Roman law, and Lain6, II, pp. 333-357,
concerning the later writers.
37. See Lain6, Introduction au Droit International Priv, II, pp.
395-413.
38. See Buzzati, L'Autorita delle Legge Straniere relative alla Forma
degli Atti Civili, pp. 13-49, 170-184; Niemeyer, Vorschriften und Ma-
terialien, pp. 98-100.
39. Audinet, p. 270; Despagnet, p. 665; Fiore, I, pp. 250-253; Pillet,
Principes, p. 486; Surville et Arthuys, p. 267; Weiss, III, p. 120.
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As for the text writers, those regarding the rule locus regit
actum in the Conflict of Laws as mandatory reject, of course,
any alternative rule in the matter of the formal execution of
negotiable instruments." Those contending that the rule has
retained its original permissive character are divided in opin-
ion upon the question whether an alternative provision is
permissible in the law of bills and notes. Of those giving an
affirmative answer some apply as the alternative rule the
common national law of the immediate parties.41  Others
regard the various contracts as unilateral obligations and
allow, therefore, a compliance with the national law of the
debtor.4 2  Others still would allow the lex patriae as the
alternative rule only when it coincides with the lex loci solu-
tionis.43 Many feel, on the other hand, that the formal char-
acter of the instrument and the security of transactions in-
volving bills and notes do not admit of an alternative rule in
the law of bills and notes.44 Jitta proposes again the law of
the fiduciary place of issue, that is, the law of the place from
which the instrument or the particular contract is dated, and,
in the absence of such an indication, the lex domicilii or when
the party in question is engaged in business or exercises a
profession, the law of the state in which he has his place of
business or office. 45
Is there a sufficient reason for the adoption of an alterna-
tive rule as regards formality in a Uniform Law for the United
States?
If an alternative rule is to be adopted, it cannot assume the
form given to it by the German and Italian law. The German
law is inacceptable because of its discrimination between cit-
izens and foreigners. The alternative rule adopted by the
Italian law-the law.of nationality common to the parties,-
cannot be approved, even if the lex domicilii be substituted
for that of the lex patriae, for the reasons advanced in the
40. Asser, p. 66; Buzzati, pp. 152-154; Demangeat, in Foelix's Trait6
du Droit International Priv6, (4th ed.) p. 184, note; Field, Art. 614;
Laurent, Le Droit Civil International, II, p. 445.
41. Audinet, p. 610; Chr~tien, pp. 84, 88; Surville et Arthuys, p. 672;
Weiss, IV, p. 449.
42. Von Bar, p. 671; Champcommunal, Annales de Droit Commercial.
1894, II, pp. 145-146; Chr~tien, pp. 882-89; Esperson, pp. 27-28.
43. Mass6, I, p. 508.
44. Diena, III, p. 28; Lyon-Caen et Renault, IV, pp. 545, 549; Meili,
II, p. 331; Ottolenghi, p. 81; Val6ry, p. 1279.
45. II, p. 46.
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discussion of alternative rules in connection with capacity.
The only alternative rule which could reasonably be consid-
ered from the standpoint of American law is the lex loci solu-
tionis, which has been actually proposed by Professor Des-
pagnet,46 of the University of Bordeaux. Is it advisable to
adopt this rule in the Uniform law? Whatever doubts may
have existed concerning the expediency of an alternative rule
as regards capacity, there can be none so far as it affects the
formal validity of bills and notes, for there are special objec-
tions which prohibit its adoption, even though it be sanctioned
with respect to capacity and with respect to the formal validity
of contracts in general.
In another place47 the author has expressed his opinion
that an alternative rule which would allow a contract to be
valid,'if it satisfied the requirements of the lex loci contractus
for the law governing its validity in other respects, might be
proper in jurisdictions where the lex loci contractus does not
control the validity of contracts. But the following reserva-
tion was made which covers the exact subject now under con-
sideration. "An exception should be made," it is there stated,
"with respect to commercial paper. The nature of the instru-
ment is here essentially dependent upon its form. Absolute
certainty in regard.to its chargcter is of the utmost impor-
tance. A fixed rule must therefore apply which, in the nature
of things, is the law of the place of issue."
That there is a valid distinction between ordinary contracts
and bills and notes appears most clearly from the German
law. Article 11 of the Law of Introduction to the Civil Code
sustains a contract, so far as its formal validity is concerned,
if it complies with the law of the place of making or with the
law governing its validity or obligation in other respects,
which, according to the prevailing rule, is the law of the place
of performance. In the interest of security of dealings in
commercial paper, this alternative provision does not extend
to bills and notes, which are governed, upon principle, by the
lex loci contractus. 48 The exceptional importance attached to
the form of bills and notes is seen also in the attitude taken
on the question of alternative rules by the Institute of Inter-
46. p. 988.
47. 20 Yale Law Journal, pp. 457-458.
48. Staub, Art. 85; Planck, Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch, Art. 11 Law of
Introduction.
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national Law 9 and the Convention of the Hague.50 Both
allow such an alternative rule as regards capacity but deny it
in the matter of the formal execution of bills and notes.
Whatever the merits of an alternative rule may be in gen-
eral, for the reasons above suggested it cannot be adopted with
respect to the formal requirements of bills and notes. In this
branch of the law at least the rule locus regit actum must have
an imperative character.
Because of the special objections in the law of bills and
notes to the adoption of an alternative rule, as regards formal-
ities, which are based upon the negotiable character of such
instruments and the consequent requirements of certainty,
there is no need of considering the provisions of the English
Wills Act or the statutory provisions existing in many states
of this country which- have introduced, in the matter of wills
and deeds, the continental rule of locus regit actum in a per-
missive sense.
The foregoing discussion relates to the essential as well
as to the formal requirement of bills and notes, for no
clear line of demarcation between the two can be drawn. This
is most apparent in countries belonging to the German group
which have adopted the formal exchange law, according to
which the rights of the parties are derived solely from the form
of the instrument.51 "The bill of exchange," says a noted Italian
writer,52 "being a literal53 contract, its form no doubt influences
the substance of the obligation." Article 85 of the German Ex-
change Law speaks accordingly only of the law governing the
essential validity of the contract, the term including all formal
requirements. In the other countries that have not adopted
the formal system of bills and notes after the German type,
for example, France, the impossibility of clearly distinguishing
between form and substance is likewise admitted. Says Des-
49. Annuaire VIII, p. 121.
50. Art. 75, Uniform Law, Senate Document No. 162, Sixty-third
Congress, First Session, p. 64.
51. See Griinhut, Wechselrecht, II, p. 572.
52. Diena, III, p. 28.
53. "The literal contract of Roman Law", says Professor Sohm, "was
a fictitious loan, which operated by virtue of the 'literae'-i. e. by
virtue of the writing in the codex as such, irrespectively altogether
of the facts actuall, underlying the relations between the parties-to
impose on the debtor an abstract liability to pay a fixed sum of
money." Institutes, Ledlie's translation, 2nd ed. p. 413.
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pagnet :5- "Without doubt certain of these requisites may refer
to matters of substance, as the 'remise de place en place' and
the indication of 'value received'. But they constitute all
parts of the context of the bill of exchange and by virtue of
that fact become matters of form." Other writers of authority
call attention to the same fact.5 5 Section 72, subdivision 1, of
the Bills of Exchange Act uses the expression "requisites of
form", but these words are to be understood no doubt as
including all essential requirements, excepting those of
capacity and consideration. In the Negotiable Instruments
Law the essential requirements for the validity of a bill or
note, apart from capacity and consideration, are found in the
chapter entitled "Form and Interpretation". The word "form"
includes therefore the essential requirements. The American
cases dealing with the question from the standpoint of the
Conflict of Laws appear to have assumed, however, that a
distinction might be drawn between the formal and essential
requisites, and that they might be subjected properly to dif-
ferent laws. While the requirement of a written form or of a
stamp has been considered a matter of formal execution, which
is determined by the lex loci contractus, the statutory provi-
sion that a negotiable note must be payable at a bank5 6 and
the prohibition of a stipulation for attorneys' fees 57 have been
classified as matters of substance and subjected to the law of
the place of payment. In none of the cases was there any
discussion of the problem involved. It is submitted that all
of the conditions prescribed by law for the creation of a bill
or note should be governed by one law-the lex loci contractus
-and that the Ariierican decisions last referred to should be
disapproved.
What has been said under Capacity concerning the mean-
ing of the lex loci contractus and the importance of the place
from which the original instrument or a supervening contract
is dated holds true also of the present subject.
Should any exceptions to the lex loci contractus like those
found in the Bills of Exchange Act or the German Exchange
Law be recognized?
54. p. 988.
55. Brocher, Cours, II, p. 318; Ottolenghi, p. 81; Weiss, IV, p. 451.
56. Barger v. Farnham, (1902) 130 Mich. 487, 90 N. W. 281; Free-
man's Bank v. Ruckman, (1860) 16 Gratt, (Va.) 126.
57. Strawberry Point Bank v. Lee, (1898) 117 Mich. 122, 75 N. W.
444.
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Assuming that the original bill or note is void for want of
compliance with the formal or essential requirements pre-
scribed by the law of the place of issue and that such a bill or
note is later accepted or indorsed in another country under
the law of which the original bill or note would have been
valid, should such acceptor or indorser be held? The English
Bills of Exchange Act and the German Exchange Law give
an affirmative answer to the question. Much controversy has
arisen on the continent as to whether the result of the German
and English acts can be reached without the aid of positive
legislation. On the one hand it is argued that inasmuch as the
different contracts on a bill or note are independent of each
other, each indorser occupying, as it were, the position of a
new drawer and the acceptor, that of the maker of a note, they
should be held if the original instrument satisfied the require-
ments of the law of the place where such acceptance or in-
dorsement occurred.58 The weakness of this argument from
the standpoint of continental law lies in the fact that in the
law of bills and notes of many of the continental countries
neither the acceptor nor the indorser of a bill or note which is
void for non-compliance with the essential requisites pre-
scribed by law, can be held as such.59 If such an acceptor or
indorser is not liable under the municipal law for the reason
that an "acceptance?' or an "indorsement" implies the existence
of a valid original bill or note, it is difficult upon theory to
hold him, from an international viewpoint, in the case now
under consideration.
Von Bar's argument is not convincing. He says :60 "But
again, on the other hand, the acceptance or the indorsement of
a bill made in this country is valid, so far as form is concerned,
although the bill itself does not satisfy the forms required by
the law of the place of issue, if only it does satisfy the condi-
tions required by the law of this country. For the acceptor
binds himself unconditionally for payment of the sum in the
bill, and the indorser binds himself in the event of the accept-
58. Von Bar, p. 673; Beauchet, Du Droit Allemand sur les Conflits de
Lois en Mati&e de Lettrds de Change, Annales de Droit Commercial,
1888, II, pp. 29-30; Champcommunal Annales de Droit Commercial,
1894, II, p. 147; Chrdtien, pp. 101-102; Esperson, pp. 31-33; Lyon-Caen
et Renault, IV, p. 550.
59. Art. 7, German General Exchange Act; Article 725, Swiss Law of
Obligations; -Art. 254, Italian Commercial Code.
60. p. 673.
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or's failure to pay: that being so, we cannot, on the other hand,
take into account the fact that the debtor may or may not have
a right of recourse or of indemnity, nor can we take into
account the reason why the prior obligant does not pay, and
that reason may be that the principal debtor in the bill has
not validly bound himself." The simple answer to v. Bar is
that in a country under the law of which neither the acceptor
nor the indorser warrants the validity of the instrument, there
is no justification for implying such a warranty when the
original instrument is issued abroad.
The solution is somewhat different under Anglo-American
law. An indorser warrants that at the time of indorsement
the instrument is a valid or subsisting bill or note.61 This
warranty would cover the invalidity of the original instrument
as a bill or note under the lex loci contractus because of non-
compliance with the formal requirements of such law.
An acceptor admits only the signature of the drawer and
not the validity of the instrument in other respects. 62 Anglo-
American law goes upon the theory that an acceptor has no
better means than the holder or indorser to ascertain the
genuineness of the body of the instrument, and that there is
no reason, therefore, why the risk of alteration or forgery
should not be thrown upon the person presenting the instru-
ment for acceptance or payment. The same reasoning applies
upon principle where the invalidity results from a non-com-
pliance with the law of the place of issue. Notwithstanding
the fact that an acceptor cannot be held in the above case upon
the ordinary principles of American law relating to negotiable
paper, and, according to the German law of bills and notes,
neither an indorser nor an acceptor can be so held, the English
and German acts impose liability upon both of these parties.
The English act provides :63 "Where a bill, issued out of the
United Kingdom, conforms, as regards requisites in form, to
the law of the United Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of
enforcing payment thereof, be treated as valid as between all
persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the
United Kingdom." This provision relates only to the original
contract, since it speaks of bills, issued out of the United King-
dom, but there is no reason why it should not apply equally
61. N. I. L., Sec. 66; B. E. A., Sec. 55 (2).
62. N. I. L., Sec. 62; B. E. A., Sec. 54 (2) (a).
63. B. E. A., Sec. 72 (1) (b).
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to the supervening contracts. The German act, which em-
braces clearly all contracts upon a bill or note issued abroad,
is worded as follows :64 "If, however, the statements inserted
abroad on the bill satisfy the requirements of the inland law,
no objection can be taken against the legal liability incurred
by statements subsequently made within the Empire (Inland)
on the ground that statements made abroad do not satisfy the
foreign laws."
Undoubtedly the above qualification of the ordinary rules
of commercial paper was adopted in the interest of a local
policy, the purpose of which is the better protection of
"inland" dealings in bills and notes. Such legislation, while
arbitrary in the sense that it does not harmonize with the
municipal law relating to bills and notes, may be justified
however, if sound policy so demands. The writer is of the
opinion that inasmuch as the security of domestic dealings
affecting such foreign bills and notes is- thereby promoted,
the exception under discussion might be adopted with advan-
tage even in a country like Germany, where neither the ac-
ceptor nor the indorser warrants the validity of the instru-
ment. He would recommend, therefore, for adoption in the
Uniform Law for the United States, Section 72 subdivision
(1) (b) of the English Bills of Exchange Act" with a change
in the phraseology, which would show clearly that it applies
to the supervening contracts as well as to the original instru-
ment.
As for the second exception to the lex loci contractus con-
tained in the English Bills of Exchange Act, a different conclu-
sion must be reached. Section 72, 1 (a) provides that: "Where
a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom it is not invalid by
reason only that it is not stamped in accordance with the law
of the place of issue." Some of the American cases, 65 as we
have seen, support the above provision on the ground that
foreign revenue laws are not entitled to recognition. The
better opinion, both in England and in this country, would
give effect to such laws, however, provided their violation
results in the invalidity of the contract and not merely in its
unenforceability until full compliance with the stamp require-
64. Arts. 85, 98.
65. Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, (1806) 1 Johns. 93; Skinner v. Tinker,
(1861) 34 Barb. 333.
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ment.66 The cases holding that the foreign stamp laws are
local or intraterritorial because fiscal in their nature, and not
entitled therefore to extraterritorial recognition, have been
condemned by practically all of the text writers both continen-
tal and Anglo-American.6 7
No reasons of a practical nature are evident why this view
should not be adopted by the Uniform Law in the United
States.68 In our relation with continental countries it would
be of no importance whether the above rule or that of the
Bills of Exchange Act were adopted, for the Hague Conven-
tion prohibits the contracting states to make the validity of a
bill or note or any contract thereon depend upon compliance
with the stamp laws, and as for bills issued in England for
circulation and payment in this country, the exception to the
rule of the lex loci contractus previously discussed, cor-
responding with Section 72, 1 (b) of the Bills of Exchange
Act, would afford a sufficient protection to those becoming




66. Bristow v. Sequeville, (1850) 5 Ex. 275; Alves v. Hodgson, (1797)
7 T. R. 241; Clegg v. Levy, (1812) 3 Camp. 166; Fant v. Miller, (1866)
17 Gratt. (Va.) 47; Satterthwaite v. Doughty, (1853) 34 N. C. 314.
67. Von Bar, p. 672; Diena, III, p. 14; Despagnet, pp. 1000-1001;
Griinhut, II, p. 571, note 12; Schaeffner, Entwicklung des Interna-
tionalen Privatrechts, p. 120; Jitta, II, p. 49; Champcommunal, An-
nales de Droit Commercial, 1894, II, p. 202; Lyon-Caen et Renault,
IV, p. 552; Ottolenghi, p. 100; Surville & Arthuys, p. 696.
Chalmers, Bills & Notes, 6th ed., p. 242; Daniel, Negotiable Instru-
ments, 6th ed., Sec. 914; Story, Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., p. 346.
68. But for the fact that the English Stamp Act requires bills issued
abroad to be stamped in England and makes no allowance for any
foreign stamp, the above view would probably have been followed also
by the Bills of Exchange Act.
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